Abstract. We propose an approach to approximate reasoning by systems of intelligent agents based on the paradigm of rough mereology. In this approach, the knowledge of each agent is formalized as an information system (a data table) from which similarity measures on objects manipulated by this agent are inferred. These similarity measures are based on rough mereological inclusions which formally render degrees for one object to be a part of another. Each agent constructs in this way its own rough mereological logic in which it is possible to express approximate statements of the type: an object x satis es a predicate in degree r: The agents communicate by means of mereological functors (connectives among distinct rough mereological logics) propagating similarity measures from simpler to more complex agents; establishing these connectives is the main goal of negotiations among agents. The presented model of approximate reasoning entails such models of approximate reasoning like fuzzy controllers, neural networks etc. Our approach may be termed analytic, in the sense that all basic constructs are inferred from data.
to bring forth an exact solution e.g. when our knowledge is incomplete or uncertain, or the problem is formulated in an imprecise (e.g. natural) language.
Many formal models of approximate reasoning are described in the literature e.g. Dempster-Schafer theory of evidence 40 We can extract from these formal models a general scheme for approximate reasoning.
It is manifest that this scheme encompasses classical models of reasoning adopted in mathematical logic 22]: the process of derivation of a formula from instances of axioms can be regarded as a synthesis process of a complex artifact from simple inventory parts and each application of a derivation rule (e.g. Modus ponens) can be regarded as an action of an agent applying its specialized operation to simpler objects in order to construct a more complex object.
At the end we discuss possible applications of the proposed formalism to quality software assessment 3], 6], 21], 27], 28].
A formal model of approximate reasoning
We present a formal model of approximate reasoning about processes of synthesis of complex objects. This approach have been developed and presented in 17 56] . In this eld a complex system of local agents is organized from a set of agents in order to synthesize a solution to a problem.
The accessible knowledge on the basis of which constructs in the synthesis process are selected and classi ed (evaluated) is as a rule incomplete, poorly de ned, or inconsistent. In consequence, we are bound to evaluate the basic ingredients of the synthesis process approximately only, in terms of values of some uncertainty measures which express a degree in which a given construct satis es a given speci cation and in terms of some functors which propagate uncertainty measures along the synthesis scheme.
The general scheme for approximate reasoning can be represented by the following tuple Appr Reas = (Ag; Link; U; St; Dec Sch; O; Inv; Unc mes; Unc prop) where (i) The symbol Ag denotes the set of agent names.
(ii) The symbol Link denotes a set of non-empty strings over the alphabet Ag; for v(ag) = ag 1 ag 2 :::ag k ag 2 Link, we say that v(ag) de nes an elementary synthesis scheme with the root ag and the leaf agents ag 1 ; ag 2 ; :::; ag k :
The intended meaning of v(ag) is that the agents ag 1 ; ag 2 ; ::; ag k are the children of the agent ag which can send to ag some simpler constructs for assembling a more complex artifact. The relation de ned via ag ag 0 i ag is a leaf agent in v(ag 0 ) for some v(ag 0 ) is usually assumed to be at least an ordering of Ag into a type of an acyclic graph; we assume for simplicity that (Ag; ) is a tree with the root root(Ag) and leaf agents in the set Leaf(Ag). is the set of standard objects at the agent ag.
(v) The symbol O denotes the set fO(ag) : ag 2 Agg of operations where O(ag) = fo i (ag)g is the set of operations at ag.
(vi) The symbol Dec Sch denotes the set of decomposition schemes; a particular decomposition scheme dec sch j is a tuple (fst(ag) j : ag 2 Agg; fo j (ag) : ag 2 Agg) which satis es the property that if v(ag) = ag 1 ag 2 :::ag k ag 2 Link then o j (ag)(st(ag 1 ) j ; st(ag 2 ) j ; ::; st(ag k ) j ) = st(ag) j for each j. The intended meaning of dec sch j is that when any child ag i of ag submits the standard construct st(ag i ) j then the agent ag assembles from st(ag 1 ) j ; st(ag 2 ) j ; ::; st(ag k ) j the standard construct st(ag) j by means of the operation o j (ag). The rule dec sch j establishes therefore a decomposition scheme of any standard construct at the agent root(Ag) into a set of consecutively simpler standards at all other agents. The standard constructs of leaf agents are primitive (inventory) standards. We can regard the set of decomposition schemes as a skeleton about which the approximate reasoning is organized.
Any rule dec sch j conveys a certain knowledge that standard constructs are synthesized from speci ed simpler standard constructs by means of speci ed operations. This ideal knowledge is a reference point for real synthesis processes in which we deal as a rule with constructs which are not standard: in adaptive tasks, for instance, we process new, unseen yet, constructs (objects, signals). This general scheme may be adapted to the particular cases. As an example, we will interpret this scheme in the case of a fuzzy controller 13]. In its version due to Mamdani 20] . This theory assumes that constructs in a given universe are perceived by means of the available information, expressed in the form of values on these objects of certain attributes (features), and in consequence these constructs which bear the same information about them are perceived as identical and form collections of indiscernible constructs. The resulting granularity of knowledge is the e ect of incompleteness of knowledge. We are not able therefore to discuss individual constructs but their collections consisting of pairwise indiscernible objects; in consequence, we discuss not the membership relation but the containment relation. The counterpart of the notion of a fuzzy membership function would be the more general notion of a partial containment.
The formal treatment of partial containment is provided by the notion of a rough inclusion 29], 32], 34]. Rough inclusions are construed as most general functional objects conveying the intuitive meaning of the relation of being a part in a degree. In particular, it turns out that the relation of being a part in the greatest possible degree is the relation of being a (possibly, improper) part in the sense of mereology of Stanislaw Le sniewski 18]. We can regard therefore a rough inclusion as a tool by means of which we extend the mereological relation of being an ingredient to a weaker relation (of being a part to a degree) over all pairs of objects in the universe. In this way, we create a family of similarity measures on pairs of objects.
In mereology of Le sniewski the notions of a (possibly improper) part, of a subset and of an element are equivalent (see 18]) and therefore we can interpret rough inclusions as global fuzzy membership functions on the universe of discourse which satisfy certain general requirements (stemming from our intuition).
We take rough inclusions of agents as measures of uncertainty in their respective universes. Remark 1.1. Any non-leaf agent ag is able to establish a local decomposition scheme of complex constructs in its universe into some simpler parts by means of its rough inclusion (ag) and the relation part (of being a (proper) part) in the induced model of mereology of Le sniewski. Remark 1.2. The mereological relation of being a part is not transitive globally over the whole synthesis scheme as distinct agents use distinct mereological languages.
The process of synthesis by a scheme of agents of a complex object x which is an approximate solution to a requirement consists in our approach of the two communication stages viz. the top -down communication/negotiation process and the bottom -up synthesis process. We outline the two stages here.
In the process of top -down communication, a requirement received by the scheme from an external source is decomposed into approximate speci cations of the form ( (ag); "(ag)) for any agent ag of the scheme. The intended meaning of the approximate speci cation ( (ag); "(ag)) is that a construct z 2 U(ag) satis es ( (ag); "(ag)) i there exists a standard st(ag) with the properties that st(ag) satis es the predicate (ag) and The uncertainty bounds "(ag) are evaluated on the basis of uncertainty propagating functions whose approximations are extracted from information systems of agents.
The synthesis of a complex object x is initiated at the leaf agents: they select primitive constructs (objects) and calculate their distances from their respective standards; then, the selected constructs are sent to the parent nodes of leaf agents along with vectors of distance values. The parent nodes synthesize complex constructs from the sent primitives and calculate the new vectors of distances from their respective standards. Finally, the root agent root(Ag) receives from its children the constructs from which it assembles the nal construct and calculates the distances of this construct from the root standards. On the basis of the found values, the root agent classi es the nal construct x with respect to the root standards as eventually satisfying ( (root(Ag); "(root(Ag)):
Our approach is analytic: all logical components ( uncertainty measures, uncertainty functions etc.) necessary for the synthesis process are extracted from the empirical knowledge of agents represented in their information systems; it is also intensional in the sense that rules for propagating uncertainty are local as they depend on a particular elementary synthesis scheme and on a particular local standard.
We conclude this section with a concise rendering of basic notions of rough set theory.
Rough set theory preliminaries
An information system is a pair A = (U; A) where U is a nite set called the universe of objects and A is a nite set of attributes; any attribute a 2 A is a mapping on the universe U. We denote by the symbol V a the range of the attribute a; the set V a is called the value set of a. We let V = fV a : a 2 Ag.
In consequence of the above assumption some objects may become indiscernible. For an object x 2 U; we de ne for a set B A the information vector Inf B (x) = f(a; a(x)) : a 2 Bg. We say that objects x; y 2 U is an equivalence relation and we denote by the symbol x] B the equivalence class of this relation which contains x. We will use the term concept for subsets of the universe U; for a concept X U, we de ne the two approximations of X relative to a set B A: BX = fx 2 U : x] B Xg and BX = fx 2 U : x] B \ X 6 = ;g.
is B-rough. The concepts BX, BX and BN B (X) have clear epistemic interpretation viz. the concept BX collects all objects which belong certainly in X, the concept U ? BX collects all objects which certainly do not belong in X and the concept BN B (X) collects all objects which are vague with respect to X i.e. have representatives both in X and in the complement of X. It follows that BN B (X) is a non-sharp boundary of X in the sense of Frege (cf. 23]).
Given a concept X, the numerical characterization of a degree in which an object x belongs in the concept X relative to the knowledge represented by an attribute set B A is provided by the rough membership function X;B 24]. We denote by the symbol Stand the class of pairs of the form (U; U ) where U is a nite set and U is the standard rough inclusion on the set U. 
Mereology of Stanis law Le sniewski
The importance for logic of the fundamental study of relations of being a part was already stressed by Aristotle (Metaphysics, Book IV). The rst modern mathematical system based on the notion of the relation of being a (proper) part was proposed by Stanis law Le sniewski 18]. We recall here the basic notions of the mereological system of Le sniewski; in the next section the mereological system of Le sniewski will be extended to the system of approximate mereological calculus called rough mereology.
We consider a nite set U; we assume that U is non-empty. A binary relation part on the set U will be called the relation of being a (proper) part in the case when the following conditions are ful lled (P1) (irre exivity) for any x 2 U, it is not true that x part x; (P2) (transitivity) for any triple x; y; z 2 U, if x part y and y part z, then x part z.
It follows obviously from (P1) and (P2) that the following property holds (P3) for any pair x; y 2 U, if x part y then it is not true that y part x.
In the case when x part y we say that the object x is a (proper) part of the object y: The notion of being (possibly) an improper part is rendered by the notion of an ingredient 18]; for objects x; y 2 U; we say that the object x is a part-ingredient of the object y when either x part y or x = y. We denote the relation of being a part-ingredient by the symbol ingr(part); hence we can write (I1) for x; y 2 U, x ingr(part) y i x part y or x = y:
It follows immediately from the de nition that the relation of being an ingredient has the following properties:
(I2) (re exivity) for any x 2 U, we have x ingr(part) x; (I3) (weak antisymmetry) for any pair x; y 2 U, if x ingr(part) y and y ingr(part) x then x = y; (I4) (transitivity) for any triple x; y; z 2 U, if x ingr(part) y and y ingr(part) z then x ingr( part) z i.e. the relation ingr(part) is a partial order on the universe U. We will call any pair (U; part); where U is a nite set and part a binary relation on the set U; which satis es the conditions (P1) and (P2), a pre-model of mereology.
We now recall the notions of a set of objects and of a class of objects 18].
For a given pre-model (U; part) of mereology and a property m which can be attributed to objects in U, we say that an object x is an object m (x object m, for short) when the object x has the property m. The property m is said to be non-void when there exists an object x 2 U such that x object m: Consider a non-void property m of objects in a set U where (U; part) is a pre-model of mereology.
An object x 2 U is said to be a set of objects with the property m when the following condition is ful lled:
(SETm) for any y 2 U, if y object m and y ingr(part) x then there exist z; t 2 U with the properties: z ingr(part) y, z ingr(part) t, t ingr(part) x and t object m:
We will use the symbol x set m to denote the fact that an object x is a set of objects with the property m.
Assume that x set m; if, in addition, the object x satis es the condition (CLm) for any y 2 U, if y object m then y ingr(part) x then we say that the object x is a class of objects with the property m and we denote this fact by the symbol x class m. We will say that a pair (U; part) is a model of mereology when the pair (U; part) is a pre-model of mereology and the condition (EUC) for any non-void property m of objects in the set U, there exists a unique object x such that x class m holds.
The following proposition 18] recapitulates the fundamental metamathematical properties of mereology of Le sniewski; observe that in mereology there is no hierarchy of objects contrary to the Cantorian naive set theory. We denote for an object x 2 U by the symbol ingr(x) the property of being an ingredient of x (non-void in virtue of (I2)) and for a property m; we denote by the symbol s(m) the property of being a set of objects with the property m. We recall the notions of an element and of a subset in mereology of Le sniewski. For x; y 2 U, we will say that (EL) the object x is an element of the object y (x el y, for short) when there exists a non-void property m such that x object m and y class m and (SUB) the object x is a subset of the object y (x sub y; for short) when for any z 2 U; if z ingr(part) x then z ingr(part) y:
The following proposition is a consequence of (I4) and Proposition 2.1(ii). We begin with the syntactical part.
Syntax of L rm
We have the following basic ingredients of the syntactic part of the logic L rm :
Variables: Formulae: atomic formulae are of the form (x; y; r), s r and formulae are built from atomic formulae as in the predicate calculus.
Axioms 8z:f n (x 1 ; x 2 ; ::; x n ; z)^ n (x 1 ; x 2 ; ::; x n ; z)] =) (y; z; !)g:
3. It follows that the intended meaning of a formula (x; y; r) is that the object x is a part of the object y in degree at least r.
A formula is true in an interpretation M i is M; g-true (i.e. ] M;g = true) for any M-value assignment g.
An interpretation M is a model of L rm i all axioms (A1)-(A6) are true in M.
We will give the basic deduction rules for L rm ; recall that a deduction rule in the form ; ;::: is said to be valid in a model M i for any M-value assignment g if the premises ; ; ::: are M; g -true then the conclusion is M; g-true. The deduction rule is valid when it is valid in any model M of L rm :
We have the following valid deduction rules contains isomorphically the quasi-boolean structure (without the least (zero) element) corresponding to the model of mereology of Le sniewski. We show that the rough inclusion satis es with respect to boolean operations of join and meet the same formal conditions which the rough membership function satis es with respect to the set-theoretic operations of union and intersection. We study relations of rough inclusions with many-valued logic and fuzzy logic; in particular, we show that when the rough inclusion is regarded as a fuzzy membership function then any fuzzy containment induced by a residual implication 13] is again a rough inclusion and, moreover, the hierarchy of objects set by the induced model of mereology of Le sniewski is invariant under these fuzzy containment operators.
We are concerned also with the problem of consistency of deduction rules of the form In the sequel we will always work with a xed reduced model M . We denote by the symbol n the null object i.e. the object existing in virtue of (A4) and such that M (n ; w ) = M for any w 2 U M : We will write u 6 = n to denote the fact that the object u is not the null object.
Let us recall that the existence of a null object in a model of mereology of Le sniewski reduces the model to a singleton, as observed in Tarski 50] . In the sequel, for simplicity of notation, we will write in place of M , U in place of U M , u in place of u etc. We will call the rough inclusion a strict rough inclusion when it satis es the condition (x; n) = 0 for any non-null object x;
we observe that any standard rough inclusion is strict.
We now show how the rough inclusion introduces in U a model of mereology of Le sniewski. To this end, we de ne a binary relation part( ) on the set U by letting u part( ) w i (u; w) = M and it is not true that (w; u) = M :
Then we have the following proposition whose straightforward proof is omitted: Proposition 4.2. The relation part( ) satis es the conditions (P1) and (P2) i.e. it is a relation of being a (proper) part in the sense of Le sniewski.
We now de ne in the model M for any collection of objects in U, the notions of a set of objects in and of a class of objects in . We will say then that u 2 U is a set of objects in , u set for short, when (S1) for any w 6 = n such that w ingr(part( )) u there exist v 6 = n and t 2 such that v ingr(part( ) ) w, v ingr(part( )) t, t ingr(part( ) ) u:
If in addition, we have (S2) t ingr(part( ) ) u for any t 2 ; (S3) for any t, if t satis es (S1) and (S2) with then u ingr(part( ) ) t then we say that u is a class of objects in , u class ; for short. It follows from (A6) that for any collection there exists a unique object u such that u class and there exists objects of the form set :
We sum up the last few observations. Now, we are ready to present a general scheme for synthesis of approximate solutions to a given requirement. We begin with introductory remarks which provide a motivation and explain our methodological assumptions.
Approximate reasoning in distributed systems: methodology
We will start from a general scheme for reasoning with uncertainty by a system of intelligent cooperating agents. We begin with an account of the structure of an agent.
The agent structure
We will discuss here the structure of a single agent ag in a scheme S of agents.
A We will work from now rather with pre -rough inclusions. Any interpretation of L rm in which requirements for 0 are satis ed is called a pre -model of L rm :
We now de ne formally the ingredients of our scheme of agents.
We consider an agent ag in the scheme. We will call the label of the agent ag the tuple 4. St(ag) = fst(ag) 1 ; :::; st(ag) n g U(ag) is the set of standard objects at ag: 5. Link(ag) is a collection of strings of the form ag 1 ag 2 :::ag k ag; the intended meaning of a string ag 1 ag 2 :::ag k ag is that ag 1 ; ag 2 ; ::; ag k are children of ag in the sense that ag can assemble complex objects (constructs) from simpler objects sent by ag 1 ; ag 2 ; :::; ag k : In general we can assume that for some agents ag we may have more than one element in Link(ag) which represents the possibility of re-negotiating the synthesis scheme. Uncertainty rules provide functional operators for propagating uncertainty measure values from the children of an agent to the agent; their application is in negotiation processes where they inform agents about plausible uncertainty bounds.
O(ag) is
9. H(ag) is a strategy which produces uncertainty rules from uncertainty relations; to this end, various rigorous formulas as well as various heuristics can be applied.
10. Dec-rule(ag) is a set of decomposition rules dec rule i of type We may sum up the content of (1) { (10) above by saying that for any agent ag the possible sets of children of this agent are speci ed and, relative to each team of children, decompositions of standard objects at ag into sets of standard objects at the children, uncertainty relations as well as uncertainty rules, which relate similarity degrees of objects at the children to their respective standards and similarity degree of the object built by ag to the corresponding standard object at ag, are given.
The approximate logic of an agent
We present in this section a formal approach to reasoning by any agent ag Atomic formulae of the logic L app (ag) are of the form (ag; ; ") where 2 L(ag) and " 2 0; 1]. The set of formulae of the logic L app (ag) is de ned as the smallest set containing all atomic formulae and closed under propositional connectives : _;^; :: The approximate formula (ag; ; ") has the intended meaning of a formula satis ed in a degree "; formally, we will say that a construct (object) x 2 U(ag) satis es the approximate formula (ag; ; "); symbolically: x j = (ag; ; "); i there exists a standard st(ag) such that st(ag) satis es the formula and o (ag)(x; st(ag)) ": We write x j = st(ag) (ag; ; ") in order to stress that the satis ability is achieved with respect to the standard st(ag). In particular, for a decomposition rule dec rule i as in (10) above x satis es (ag; (ag); ") whenever o (ag)(x; st(ag)) "; clearly, st(ag) satis es the approximate formula (ag; (ag); 1). For any pair of formulae ; of the logic L app (ag) and any x 2 U(ag), we let x j = _ i either x j = or x j = and x j = : i it is not the case that x j = :
5.3 The approximate reasoning by a system of agents
We now consider a system S of agents over an inventory INV . We assume that the relation , de ned by ag 0 ag i ag 1 ag 2 :::ag k ag 2 Link(ag) and there exists i k such that ag 0 = ag i , orders S into a tree; we assume that any agent ag in S has exactly n standards which satisfy the composition rule in the sense that if ag 1 ag 2 :::ag k ag 2 Link(ag) and ag i produces from standards st(ag 1 1 ) j ,...., st(ag k k k ) j the standard st(ag) j . We denote by the symbol Root(S) the root agent of the scheme S and the symbol Leaf(S) will denote the set of leaf (inventory) agents of S.
Let us recall that our approach is motivated by the following observations:
1. The knowledge of an agent in a scheme for reasoning under uncertainty is incomplete. In particular, an agent may not be able to distinguish among certain requirements(speci cations, formulas etc.) and its understanding of requirements is approximate only.
2. The local decomposition knowledge of an agent may also be uncertain and this knowledge may not be understood fully by other agents as the agents possess incomplete fragments of the knowledge about the world.
3. The leaf agents having an access to the inventory of elementary objects may be able to select objects which satisfy the requirements not exactly but in an acceptable degree only. 6. Problem speci cations are issued by the external agent cag (the customer agent) in a language understandable (up to some degree) to some agents in the scheme (in particular, to the root agent R). The speci c form of the language depends on the particular synthesis process.
The object x synthesized by the scheme as an approximate solution to a requirement is evaluated by the agent cag with respect to its local knowledge. The process of learning the correct synthesis of solutions to a given speci cation is concluded when the two evaluations are consistent.
7. Universes of objects (universes of discourse) of agents are models of L rm in which certain collections of objects, called standard objects, are distinguished. The rough inclusions of the universes induce rough mereological distance functions in their respective domains by means of which objects are perceived and characterized with respect to the standards in the respective universe.
8. The semantics of the approximate logic of formulas of the form (ag; ; ) of any agent ag is de ned in terms of standards of ag and the rough mereological distance function in the universe of objects of the agent ag. (ii) o (ag)(g(ag); st (ag)) (ag) for any leaf agent in S:
For the root agent R(S) of the scheme S, we say that a formula (R(S); ; ) in the logic L app (R(S)) is consistent with a {constructive subscheme S if (i) (R(s)) =) ; (ii) (R(S)) :
Let S be a {constructible subscheme compatible with an S{admissible object assignment g. Then a formula (R(S); ; ) is satis ed by an S{object assignment g if g(R(s)) j = st (R(S)) (R(S); ; ); we write in this case g j = S (R(S); ; ):
The following proposition which follows directly from the above de nitions expresses a su ciency criterium for synthesis of an object x 2 U(R(S)) which satis es an approximate requirement (R(S); ; ): Proposition 5.2. If a formula (R(S); ; ) is consistent with a { constructive subscheme S and the ? constructive subscheme S is compatible with an admissible S{object assignment g; then g j = S (R(S); ; ):
It follows from this proposition that the object x = g(R(S)) which satis es the approximate requirement (R(S)); ; ) can be constructed by the scheme S in the case when a ? constructive subscheme S and an S -object assignment g can be negotiated by the agents in S which are such that : the approximate requirement (R(S); ; ) is consistent with S and S is compatible with the S -object assignment g: 
Uncertainty functions from data
We outline an algorithm which may be used to extract from information systems of agents in a scheme S approximations to uncertainty functions ( rough mereological connectives). Example 6.3. We will determine an approximation to the mereological connective at the standard x 1 y 1 i.e: a function f such that:
for any pair 1 ; 2 ;
if (x; x 1 ) 1 and (y; y 1 ) 2 then (xy; x 1 y 1 ) f( 1 ; 2 ):
The following tables show conditions which f is to ful ll.
x (x; x1) y (y; y1) (xy; x1y1) Table 6 . The conditions for f (second part)
Step 1. For each pair ( (x; x 1 ) = " 1 ; (y; y 1 ) = " 2 ); nd "(" 1 ; " 2 ) = minf" : " Let T 1 be the table of vectors (" 1 ; " 2 ; "(" 1 ; " 2 )).
Step 2. For each " such that (" 1 ; " 2 ; "(" 1 ; " 2 ) = " ) 2 T 1 ; nd: row(" ) = (" 1 ; " 2 ; " ) where (" 1 ; " 2 ; " ) 2 T 1 and if (" We can now give an example of a synthesis.
Approximate synthesis from data: an example
We give an example of synthesis; in the synthesis process, we make use of prerough inclusions and approximations to rough mereological connectives which were found above.
